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Taylor: C.R.B. v. C.C.

C.R.B. V. C.C. AND B.C. 1 : PROTECTING CHILDREN ’S NEED FOR STABILITY IN
CUSTODY MODIFICATION DISPUTES BETWEEN BIOLOGICAL PARENTS AND THIRD
PARTIES
“Custody litigation, unlike most other litigation, attempts to predict the future
rather than to understand the past.”2
I. INTRODUCTION
More than one million American children are affected by their parents’ divorce each
year,3 and custody decisions 4 are “[a]mong the most difficult decisions judges must
make today.”5 In particular, child custody disputes involving biological parents and
third parties create extremely complex issues that challenge courts and legislators to
determine the significance of biology.6 In C.R.B. v. C.C. and B.C.,7 a father and his
1

959 P.2d 375 (Alaska 1998).
Joan G. Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of Child Custody Decrees, 94 YALE L.J.
757, 762 (1985). Litigation results often depend on the court’s determination of whether a
prior event did or did not occur. Id. However, in custody litigation, courts frequently
examine the parties’ personalities, priorities, financial status, and emotional stability to
attempt to make the optimum judgment for the child’s future. Id.
3
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS , STATISTICAL A BSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 106 (117th ed.
1997). During 1990, an estimated 1,075,000 children were involved in divorce. Id. During
1980, an estimated 1,174,000 children were involved in divorce. Id. During 1970, an estimated
870,000 children were involved in divorce. Id.
4
Cases and statutes rarely provide a definition of the term “custody.” HOMER H. CLARK,
JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 19.2 (2nd ed. 1988). It has
been labeled as a “slippery” word because it “expresses a complex of both rights and
obligations, the combination of which varies considerably from case to case.” Id. Black’s
Law Dictionary defines ‘custody of children’ as “[t]he care, control and maintenance of a
child which may be awarded by a court to one of the parents as in a divorce or separation
proceedings.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 267 (6th ed. 1991). Significantly, statutory or
common law in every state allows the courts to modify custody orders. Wexler, supra note 2,
at 760; see discussion infra Part II.B.1. In contrast, adoption is a legal process that actually
terminates the legal rights and obligations that exist between the biological parents and the
child. See Homer, supra, at § 20.1.
5
Eric P. Salthe, Note, Would Abolishing the Natural Parent Preference in Custody
Disputes Be in Everyone's Best Interest?, 29 J. FAM. L. 539, 539 (1990/1991). Salthe asserts,
“In many circumstances both prospective custodians feel very strongly about the child, and
in the most difficult cases both are perfectly able to take on the responsibility of custody.”
Id.
6
Carolyn Wilkes Kaas, Breaking up a Family or Putting it Back Together Again:
Refining the Preference in Favor of the Parent in Third-party Custody Cases, 37 W M. &
M ARY L. REV. 1045, 1048 (1996). Third party involvement in custody cases forces both courts
and legislators to evaluate the very meaning of the term “parent.” Id. In addition, some of
these custody cas es “highlight the often conflicting societal values of providing nurturing
2
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children’s maternal grandparents8 were embroiled in a custody battle. 9 The father
attempted to modify a prior custody order that granted permanent custody of his
children to the grandparents.10 Consequently, the Alaska Supreme Court was forced to
weigh “two foundational policies in child custody law . . . the law’s preference for
parental over nonparental custody, and the law’s desire to meet children’s needs for
stability . . . .”11
This Note examines the collision of the “foundational policies” recognized by the
Alaska Supreme Court. Part II provides an overview of the parental preference
doctrine and custody modification standards.12 Part III presents the facts, procedural
history, and the Alaska Supreme Court’s holding in C.R.B.13 Finally, Part IV analyzes
the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision and its consequences.14 The Alaska Supreme
Court properly rejected the use of a parental preference in custody modification
disputes, and its holding produced a desirable outcome. 15 However, this Note
establishes why the court should adopt a more stringent modific ation standard to
safeguard children’s need for stability in future custody modification cases.16
II. BACKGROUND
A. The “Parental Preference” Doctrine
and safe homes for children and leaving parents free to raise their children in their own way,
without intrusion.” Id. at 1048-49. In initial custody disputes between biological parents,
courts award custody based on the best interests of the child. Janet Leach Richards, The
Natural Parent Preference Versus Third Parties: Expanding the Definition of Parent, 16
NOVA L. REV. 733, 734 (1992). Under this standard, the child’s needs and welfare are superior
to either parent’s interest. Id.
7
C.R.B. v. C.C., 959 P.2d 375 (Alaska 1998).
8
The nuclear family structure began to erode in the mid-1960's, and as a result,
grandparents have been assuming active parental roles at an increasing rate. Robert C.
Paden, Jr., Child Custody and Visitation Rights: Parents v. Grandparents, 52 J. M O. B. 156,
156 (1996). The number of children living in households headed by grandparents has
increased by over fifty percent since 1970, and both parents are absent in approximately onethird of these households. Mary C. Rudasill, Grandparents Raising Grandchildren:
Problems and Policy from an Illinois Perspective, 3 ELDER L.J. 215, 216 (1995). This growth
in households headed by grandparents has promp ted national attention, legislation, and state
policy revisions. Id. at 216.
9
C.R.B., 959 P.2d at 376.
10
Id. at 377.
11
Id. at 379.
12
See infra notes 17-51 and accompanying text.
13
See infra notes 52-72 and accompanying text.
14
See infra notes 73-124 and accompanying text.
15
See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
16
See discussion infra Part IV.
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1. Description, Development of the Law, and Current Trends
Custody standards that give preference to biological parents reflect the historical
view of the relationship between parents and their children.17 Although society no
longer regards children as the property of their parents, the view that biological parents
have a natural right to the custody of their children has endured.18 The United States
Supreme Court has not specifically addressed whether courts should apply a parental
preference in custody disputes between a biological parent and a third party.19
However, the Supreme Court’s decision in Michael H. v. Gerald D. 20 eliminates the
17

Melanie B. Lewis, Note, Inappropriate Application of the Best Interests of the Child
Standard Leads to Worst Case Scenario: In re C.C.R.S., 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 259, 262 (1997).
Until the nineteenth century, the state refused to intrude on the parent-child relationship and
gave parents total command over their children. Id. By the twentieth century, society
recognized that children are individuals, and that they also require protection. Id. However,
the state continued to refuse to intervene unless the parental care endangered the child. Id.
18
Id.; see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The
Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L.
REV. 879 (1984) [hereinafter Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood]. Bartlett discusses the role of
natural law in the concept of parenthood as an exclusive status. Id. at 886. Natural law
dictates that parental rights “arise from a relationship that is entirely apart from the power of
the State.” Id. These rights exist regardless of whether a parent acts in the child’s best
interest. Id. at 889. Also, natural law presumes that because the basic building block of
society is the family, the entire fabric of society will disintegrate if parents are unable to raise
their children without intervention. Id. at 888. Therefore, the law often dictates that
relationships based on psychological bonds must be sacrificed for those based on biology.
Id. at 882. However, the rigid nature of the natural law framework works to the detriment of
children who form meaningful bonds outside of the nuclear family unit. Id. at 890. As stated
by Bartlett, “[T]hese children are powerless to change the social patterns of which they are a
part, and they cannot respond meaningfully to legal or social sanctions intended to promote
the nuclear family.” Id.
19
Suzette M. Haynie, Note, Biological Parents v. Third Parties: Whose Right to Child
Custody Is Constitutionally Protected?, 20 GA. L. REV. 705, 728-29 (1986).
20
491 U.S. 110 (1989), superseded by statute as stated in Jones v. Trojak, 586 A.2d 397
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). While Carole D. and Gerald D. were married and cohabitating, Carole
gave birth to Victoria. Id. at 113. Michael H. filed an action in the California Superior Court to
prove he was Victoria’s biological father and obtain visitation rights. Id. at 114. Blood tests
showed a 98.07% probability that Michael was Victoria’s biological father. Id. However,
pursuant to a state statute, the court refused to admit the blood tests into evidence, granted
Gerald motion for summary judgment, and denied Michael any visitation. See id. at 115.
Michael argued that the United States Supreme Court had previously recognized a parent’s
fundamental constitutional right to visitation or custody of their biological children. Id. at
123. However, the United States Supreme Court clarified that the fundamental right referred to
in previous decisions was the right to a “protected family unit” rather than a biological
parent’s right to custody. See id. at 124.
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contention that courts are required to utilize a parental preference. 21 In addition, several
recent Supreme Court decisions suggest that parental rights are derived from the
biological parent’s relationship with their child rather than the biological connection.22
In initial custody disputes between a biological parent and a third party, a majority of
states apply a parental preference standard.23 First, several states 24 have adopted a
parental rights standard, which precludes a court from considering a third party as a
custodian without a threshold showing of extraordinary circumstances.25 Second,
most states apply a rebuttable presumption26 that favors the biological parent.27 Many
21

See Salthe, supra note 5, at 547. Salthe states that the essence of the Supreme Court’s
decision was to “shift the fundamental right at issue to one that protects the interpersonal
relationships that develop within the unitary family, rather than one that singularly protects
the biological relationships.” Id. at 548. As a result, courts are free to make decisions based
on public policy when deciding whether to favor biological parents in custody battles. Id. at
548.
22
Haynie, supra note 19 at 729; see, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494
(1977) (concluding that the Constitution protects a family unit, even if the family members are
not the child’s biological parents, if it is providing for the child’s needs); Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (emphasizing that
“the importance of the family relationship . . . stems from the emotional attachments that
derive from the intimacy of daily association . . .”). Haynie argues that any standard used in
custody disputes that provides a preference to a biological parent is unconstitutional.
Haynie, supra note 19, at 706.
23
See Haynie, supra note 19, at 711. States that do not apply a parental preference
standard include Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, New Hampshire,
North Dakota, South Carolina, Texas, and Wyoming. Id. at 721 & n.58. Instead, these states
apply a best interests standard, which focuses solely on the needs and welfare of the child.
Id. at 721. The best interests standard emerged in the mid-1960’s in response to the erosion
of the nuclear family. Paden, supra note 8, at 156. In states that apply the best interests
standard, nonparents have a greater chance of obtaining custody since the court may find
that nonparental custody is in the child’s best interests. Id. This standard “has been
criticized as resulting in an indeterminacy perhaps unparalleled in any other area of the law.”
Wexler, supra note 2, at 779-80; see discussion infra Part IV.A.1.
24
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Oklahoma, and West Virginia clearly utilize a
parental rights standard. Haynie, supra note 19, at 708 & n.12. Mississippi uses the language
of the parental rights standard but seems to be willing to consider additional evidence. Id.
25
Kaas, supra note 6, at 1065 (providing a “blueprint” for deciding third party initial
custody disputes and distinguishing between appropriate standards for “removal” and
“reunification”). Some jurisdictions consider this standard to be required by the United
States Constitution, while other jurisdictions have adopted it as a matter of policy. Id. In
New York, extraordinary circumstances include abuse, abandonment, neglect, or parental
unfitness. See, e.g., Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E. 2d 277, 280 (N.Y. 1976).
26
A ‘presumption’ is “an assumption of fact that the law requires to be made from another
fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action. . . . A presumption is
either conclusive or rebuttable.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 822 (6th ed. 1991). A ‘conclusive
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courts adopted this presumption based on the assumption that granting custody to a
biological parent promotes the child’s best interests.28 Courts applying a parental
preference will award custody to a “fit” parent29 even if a child has been residing with a
third party for an extended period of time. 30
2. Alaska: Development of the Law
Alaska courts apply a parental preference in initial custody disputes between
biological parents and third parties.31 In Turner v. Pannick,32 the Alaska Supreme
presumption’ is “created when a jury is charged that it must infer the presumed fact if certain
predicate facts are established.” Id. In contrast, a ‘rebuttable presumption’ “can be
overturned upon the showing of sufficient proof.” Id.
27
See, e.g., Haynie, supra note 19, at 711. Haynie categorizes three types of
presumptions. First, the fitness presumption standard presumes that the biological parent will
be the best parent unless the third party proves that extraordinary circumstances make the
third party more fit than the parent. Id. at 712. The third party’s burden remains “almost
unsurmountable.” Id. Second, in the convincing presumption standard the biological parent
has a prima facie right to custody unless the third party shows by clear and convincing
evidence that they should have custody b ased on the best interests of the child. Id. at 715.
Third, under the disappearing presumption standard, the courts consider factors regarding
the best interests of the child, and the presumption gives custody to the biological parent
only if all other factors are equal. Id. at 720.
28
See Richards, supra note 6, at 736. (“This rule is based logically upon the experience of
mankind that blood is thicker than water and that a natural parent will normally expend greater
effort and sacrifice on behalf of a child than will a stranger or a third party . . .”) (quoting In re
Custody of Hampton, 5 Adams Co. L.J. 84, 91 (Pa. C.P. 1963)); see also Michael B. Thompson,
Child-Custody Disputes Between Parents and Non-parents: A Plea for the Abrogation of the
Parental-right Doctrine in South Dakota, 34 S.D. L. REV. 534, 534 (1989) (stating that a
parental preference “focuses . . . on parental fitness, presuming that parents are best able to
nurture their children”).
29
Factors indicating that a parent is not fit include “misconduct, neglect, immorality,
abandonment and/or general dereliction of custodial duties.” Salthe, supra note 5, at 541.
30
Sandra R. Blair, Jurisdiction, Standing, and Decisional Standards in ParentNonparent Custody Disputes--In Re Marriage of Allen, W ASH. L. REV. 111, 116 (1982)
(asserting that the best interests of the child standard should be utilized since parental rights
are a factor in the balancing process, and therefore, are protected, and stating that the
parental preference doctrine is premised on an “almost mystical belief in the superiority of the
biological parents”).
31
See Turner v. Pannick, 540 P.2d 1051 (Alaska 1975); see also Carter v. Novotny, 779 P.2d
1195 (Alaska 1989); Britt v. Britt, 567 P.2d 308 (Alaska 1977). In contrast, in initial custody
disputes between biological parents, the Alaska courts award custody based on the best
interests of the child. See A LASKA STAT . § 25.24.150 (Lexis Law Publishing 1998). A LASKA
STAT . § 25.24.150 (Lexis Law Publishing 1998) reads as follows:
(a) In an action for divorce or for legal separation or for placement of a child when
one or both parents have died, the court may, if it has jurisdiction under AS
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Court held that in an initial custody determination, the court must award custody to a
biological parent unless the third party shows33 that “the parent is unfit,34 has
25.30.300--25.30.320, and is an appropriate forum under AS 25.30.350 and 25.30.360,
during the pendency of the action, or at the final hearing or at any time thereafter
during the minority of a child of the marriage, make, modify, or vacate an order for
the custody of or visitation with the minor child that may seem necessary or proper,
including an order that provides for visitation by a grandparent or other person if
that is in the best interests of the child.
(b) If a guardian ad litem for a child is appointed, the appointment shall be made
under the terms of AS 25.24.310(c).
(c)The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interests of the
child under AS 25.20.060 -- 25.20.130. In determining the best interests of the child
the court shall consider
(1) the physical, emotional, mental, religious, and social needs of the child;
(2) the capability and desire of each parent to meet these needs;
(3) the child's preference if the child is of sufficient age and capacity to form a
preference;
(4) the love and affection existing between the child and each parent;
(5) the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and
the desirability of maintaining continuity;
(6) the desire and ability of each parent to allow an open and loving frequent
relationship between the child and the other parent;
(7) any evidence of domestic violence, child abuse, or child neglect in the
proposed custodial household or a history of violence between the parents;
(8) evidence that substance abuse by either parent or other members of the
household directly affects the emotional or physical well-being of the child;
(9) other factors that the court considers pertinent.
(d) In awarding custody the court may consider only those facts that directly affect
the well-being of the child.
(e) Notwithstanding the provisions of (d) of this section, in awarding custody the
court shall comply with the provisions of 25 U.S.C. 1901 -- 1963 (P.L. 95-608, the
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978).
(f) If the issue of child custody is before the court at the time it issues a judgment
under AS 25.24.160, the court shall concurrently issue a judgment for custody under
this section unless, subject to AS 25.24.155, the court delays the custody decision
for a later time.
Id.
32

540 P.2d 1051 (Alaska 1975).
Carter, 779 P.2d at 1197 (indicating that the burden of proof is on the third party); Britt,
567 P.2d at 310 (stating that the nonparent must overcome the parental preference by a
preponderance of the evidence).
34
In Britt, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the superior court’s finding that the mother
was unfit was clearly erroneous. Britt, 567 P.2d at 310. The Alaska Supreme Court stated that
evidence of the mother’s youth, pregnancy, remarriage, and relocations fell “far short of the
showing which must be made.” Id. at 311. “Where custody is being contested between a
33
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abandoned the child,35 or that the welfare of the child requires that a non-parent receive
custody.”36 The “welfare of the child” requirement is satisfied by evidence that
parental custody would be clearly detrimental to the child.37
B. Modification of Custody: “Substantial Change in Circumstances” Standard
1. Description, Development of the Law, and Current Trends
Although it appears that there are a greater number of hearings and trials regarding
modification of custody rather than initial custody, literature has paid little attention to
custody modifications.38 Regardless of whether the initial custody decree results from
litigation or is consensual, it is universally recognized that the court possesses judicial
power to modify the decree. 39

parent and a non-parent, it is not enough that this evidence may support the conclusion that
the non-parent would provide a better environment for the child.” Id.
35
The Alaska Supreme Court previously specified “what constitutes sufficient
abandonment to deprive a mother of custody of her child.” Turner, 540 P.2d at 1055 & n.4
“[A]bandonment consists of conduct on the part of the parent which implies a conscious
disregard of the obligations owed by a parent to the child, leading to the destruction of the
parent-child relationship.” Id. (quoting D.M. v. State, 515 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Alaska 1973)).
36
Turner, 540 P.2d at 1055. In Turner, the child’s mother filed a petition against the
child’s aunt to obtain custody of her child. Id. at 1052. The Alaska Supreme Court noted that
prior Alaska law was ambiguous in regards to the test applicable in custody disputes between
a biological parent and a third party. Id. at 1053. The Alaska Supreme Court held that the
mother was entitled to custody because the aunt did not show that the mother was unfit or
had abandoned the child, or that the child’s welfare required the court to award custody to
the aunt. Id. at 1055. The Alaska Supreme Court reasoned that it is dangerous to give courts
the power to use the best interests test as its sole criterion to award custody to third parties.
Id. at 1054. The Alaska Supreme Court was concerned that if a judge personally opposes the
biological parents’ limited means, the parents may lose custody of their children. Id.
37
Turner, 540 P.2d at 1054; see also Buness v. Gillen, 781 P.2d 985, 989 (Alaska 1989). In
Buness, a third party was the child’s primary care-giver for ten years. Id. at 989. The Alaska
Supreme Court held that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the
child’s welfare dictated that the third party receive custody. Id. The Alaska Supreme Court
reasoned that the child and the third party had a “strong emotional bond.” Id. A school
psychologist’s report noted the child’s “highly emotional response” upon learning that he
had to leave the third party’s home. Id.
38
Wexler, supra note 2, at 757.
39
Id. at 760. A court has the power to modify a custody order either by its “express
statutory authority or by its common law equity powers over the welfare of children.” Id.
Also, jurisdiction is always available, even if the court that issued the initial order did not
reserve jurisdiction. Id. In contrast, an order terminating parental rights is final, and once it is
entered, the parent loses any possibility of obtaining custody. See, e.g., Thompson, supra
note 28, at 559.
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The trend in the law indicates that moving parties are obtaining custody
modifications with greater ease. 40 There are three standards used by state courts to
modify custody orders.41 First, the traditional custody modification standard permits
modification if the moving party demonstrates a substantial change in circumstances
that warrants a modification to further the child’s best interests.42 Second, several
states have relaxed these requirements and apply a best interests test without requiring a
threshold showing of a substantial change in circumstances since the initial custody
decree. 43 Finally, the standard under the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
(hereinafter the “UMDA”) 44 requires either consent or a showing of serious harm to the

40

Wexler, supra note 2, at 760.
Id.
42
Id. The traditional standard has been the controlling law in a majority of jurisdictions
for many years. Id. at 761. In most states adopting this standard, the standard is derived from
judge-made law that adds gloss to general statutes stating that modification may be granted
according to the child’s best interests. Id. Judges applying this standard possess a
tremendous amount of discretion. Id. at 762. Wexler writes, “Not surprisingly, decisions
made in this framework are less a product of reasoned application of precedent than of the
personality, temperament, background, interests, and biases of the trial judge or of the
community that elected him.” Id. The moving party must show that the change occurred
subsequent to the initial custody order, or that a fact was not within the court’s knowledge.
Id. at 765. In states adopting this traditional standard, re-litigation, rather than finality, is
encouraged. Id. at 763.
43
Id. at 760-61.
44
UNIF . MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE A CT § 101-506 (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A. 159 (1998).
The modification standard provides:
[T]he Court shall not modify a prior custody decree unless it finds, upon the basis
of facts that have arisen since the prior decree or that were unknown to the court at
the time of the entry of the prior decree, that a change has occurred in the
circumstances of the child or his custodian, and that the modification is necessary
to serve the best interest of the child. In applying theses standards the court shall
retain the custodian appointed pursuant to the prior decree unless:
(1) the custodian agrees to the modification;
(2) the child has been integrated into the family of the petitioner with consent of the
custodian; or
(3) the child’s present environment endangers seriously his physical, mental, moral,
or emotional health, and the harm likely to be caused by a change of environment
endangers seriously his physical, mental, moral or emotional health, and the harm
likely to be caused by a change in environment is outweighed by its advantages to
him.
Id. § 409(b). In addition, during the first two years after the initial custody order, a court
cannot review a modification application unless the movant can establish by affidavit “that
there is reason to believe the child’s present environment may endanger seriously his
physical, mental, moral, or emotional health.” Id. § 409(a).
41
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2. Alaska: Development of the Law
In Alaska, a motion to modify custody must allege facts that, if proved, would
establish a substantial change in circumstances.46 Prior to C.R.B., Alaska courts
applied this standard in modification disputes between biological parents but had not
determined which standard applies in disputes between biological parents and third
parties.47 The party moving for custody modification must show changes that affect
the child’s welfare. 48 In addition, these changes must reflect more than the passage of
45

Wexler, supra note 2, at 773. Only two states have statutes which fully adopt the
UMDA provisions. Id. at 776 (citing COLO. REV. STAT . § 14-10-131 (Supp. 1983); KY. REV.
STAT . § 403.340 (1984)). Several other states, including Arizona, Illinois, and Washington,
have adopted portions of the UMDA provisions. Id.
46
A LASKA STAT . § 25.20.110 (Lexis Law Publishing 1998) states:
(a) An award of custody of a child or visitation with the child may be modified if the
court determines that a change in circumstances requires the modification of the
award and the modification is in the best interests of the child. If a parent opposes
the modification of the award of custody or visitation with the child and the
modification is granted, the court shall enter on the record its reason for the
modification.
(b) When making a determination relating to child custody under (a) of this section,
the court shall consider the past history of the parents with respect to their
compliance with the child support payment provisions of temporary or permanent
support orders or agreements relating to the child or to other children. Under this
subsection, the court may consider a parent’s failure to pay child support only if the
parent had actual knowledge of the amount of the child support obligation and had
funds available for payment of support or could have obtained those funds through
reasonable efforts, as determined by the court.
(c ) In a proceeding involving the modification of an award for custody of a child or
visitation with a child, a finding that a crime involving domestic violence has
occurred since the last custody or visitation determination is a finding of a change
of circumstances under (a) of this section.
Id. Before and after codification of its rule in 1982, the Alaska Supreme Court required that
the change in circumstances be “substantial.” See, e.g., Deivert v. Oseira, 628 P.2d 575, 578
(Alaska 1981) (“The concept of ‘substantial change’ of circumstances . . . may be considered
simply a rule of judicial economy designed to discourage discontented parents from
continually renewing custody proceedings.”); Garding v. Garding, 767 P.2d 183, (Alaska
1989) (stating that the party moving for custody modification had the burden of proving a
substantial change in circumstances).
47
See C.R.B. v. C.C. 959 P.2d 375 & n.3 (Alaska 1998).
48
S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875, 878 (Alaska 1985). In S.N.E., the Alaska Supreme Court
held that the superior court improperly relied on a “real or imagined social stigma attaching to
Mother’s status as a lesbian.” Id. at 879. “Consideration of a parent’s conduct is appropriate
only when the evidence supports a finding that a parent’s conduct has or reasonably will
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time. 49 A party may show substantial change by demonstrating unilateral improvement
in his or her own circumstances.50 Significantly, Alaska courts have consistently
recognized the importance of stability in children’s lives by asserting that the changes
must overcome our deep reluctance to shuttle children back and forth.51
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
During 1988, Catherine and Roberto52 got married.53 Catherine had developed a
cocaine addiction prior to the marriage. 54 Catherine and Roberto had two children,
Peter, who was born in 1989, and Brian, who was born in 1991.55 In 1992, Catherine
and Roberto were divorced by decree of dissolution in the Superior Court at Anchorage,
and Roberto gave sole custody of Peter and Brian to Catherine. 56

have an adverse impact on the child and his best interests.” Id. The Alaska Supreme Court
reasoned that the record indicated that parental neglect was absent, the child’s development
was superb, and there was no increased probability that the child would become homosexual.
Id.; see also Craig v. McBride, 639 P.2d 303, 306 (Alaska 1982) (stating that a parent’s
instability in relationships will not justify modification of custody if the behavior does not
affect the child).
49
Nichols v. Nichols, 516 P.2d 732, 734 & n.3 (Alaska 1973) (holding that the evidence was
insufficient to show a change in circumstances).
50
See Nichols v. Mandelin, 790 P.2d 1367, 1372 & n.15 (Alaska 1990) (holding that
evidence of the mother’s “overall maturation,” her control of a former alcohol problem, and
changes in her employment and marital status constituted a substantial change in
circumstances that warranted a modification of custody). The Alaska Supreme Court
previously held that a change in custody cannot be justified by mere improvement in the
circumstances of one of the parties. See, e.g., Garding, 767 P.2d at 186; Gratrix v. Gratrix,
652 P.2d at 76, 82 (Alaska 1982). However, Nichols v. Mandelin distinguished Garding and
Gratrix “on the basis that these decisions were not intended to preclude a trial court from
finding that significant long term changes in a party’s lifestyle could constitute a substantial
change in circumstances . . . .” Nichols v. Mandelin, 790 P.2d at n.15.
51
Nichols v. Nichols, 516 P.2d at 735 (“Children should not be shuttled back and forth
between divorced parents unless there are important circumstances justifying such change . .
. .”); see also Gratrix, 652 P.2d at 82-83 (Alaska 1982) (stating that “finality and certainty in
custody matters are critical to the child’s emotional welfare); Morel v. Morel, 647 P.2d 605, 608
(Alaska 1982) (asserting that the Alaska Supreme Court has “continually stressed the
desirability of maintaining continuity of care”).
52
The Alaska Supreme Court used pseudonyms throughout its opinion. C.R.B., 959 P.2d
at 376.
53
Id. at 377.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Brief for Appellees at 1, C.R.B. v. C.C., 959 P.2d 375 (Alaska 1998) (No. S-8104)
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B. Procedural History
A “drug-induced crisis” during 1993 motivated Carl and Betty Clark, the children’s
maternal grandparents, to obtain interim custody and move for permanent custody in
the Superior Court at Palmer.57 Roberto subsequently filed a motion to modify the
divorce decree to give him custody of Peter and Brian.58 However, he withdrew his
motion in 1994.59 In January, 1995, the superior court granted the Clarks sole legal
and physical custody of the children.60 In September, 1996, Roberto moved to modify
the custody order, arguing that changes in his circumstances warranted modification.61
The superior court dismissed Roberto’s motion during February, 1997.62 The superior
court held that Roberto’s factual assertions, even if true, do not show a substantial
change of circumstances to warrant modification.63 Roberto appealed the denial of his

(incorporating by reference the Statement of the Case in their Cross Appellants’ Brief).
57
C.R.B., 959 P.2d at 377. The Clarks claimed not to know of Roberto’s whereabouts, but
Roberto disputed this. Id. Roberto learned of the custody proceedings during 1993. Id.
58
Brief for Appellees at 1, C.R.B. v. C.C., 959 P.2d 375 (Alaska 1998) (No. S-8104)
(incorporating by reference the Statement of the Case in their Cross Appellants’ Brief).
“Contrary to [Roberto’s] assertion in his Appellant Brief . . . his motion to change custody
was never opposed.” Id. In addition, Roberto filed “lengthy” affidavits from himself and his
new wife claiming that they were “ready, willing and very anxious” to obtain custody. Id.
59
C.R.B., 959 P.2d at 377. During September, 1996, Roberto stated that he withdrew from
the 1993-94 custody proceeding because the Clarks told him they only wanted temporary
custody. Id. He stated that he did not realize his custody rights were at risk and did not keep
in touch with his attorney because of his financial situation. Id. Roberto filed a letter that he
wrote to the superior court after he withdrew his custody motion and prior to trial. “I still
wish to gain custody and my visiting [privileges],” he stated in the letter, but “I have not filed
for custody again as my budget cannot endure any more lawyer and court fees . . . . I am not
an absent[ee] parent . . . .” Id.
60
Id. Roberto did not appear at the trial in the superior court on the Clarks’ motion for
permanent custody. Id. In addition, Roberto did not visit his children from July, 1993 until
March, 1996. Brief for Appellees at 1, C.R.B. v. C.C., 959 P.2d 375 (Alaska 1998) (No. S-8104)
(incorporating by reference the Statement of the Case in their Cross Appellants’ Brief).
61
C.R.B., 959 P.2d at 377. Roberto argued that the following changes in circumstances
were substantial and that they warranted a modification of the custody order: Roberto
obtained his American citizenship; Roberto’s marriage and business had grown stable and
successful; Roberto and his new wife purchased a home in a suburb that was well-suited for
the children; Roberto was rebuilding relationships with his sons after three years without
communication; the Clarks had developed health problems; the Clarks were interfering with
Roberto’s relations with his sons; and Roberto discovered that Betty Clark was the subject of
a child-in-need-of-aid (“CINA”) investigation in 1980. Id.
62
Id. at 378. The superior court dismissed the motion without a hearing. Id.
63
Id. at 384.
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C. Alaska Supreme Court Decision
The Alaska Supreme Court analyzed whether a biological parent moving to modify a
court order awarding permanent legal custody to a third party must make the same
threshold showing of a substantial change in circumstances as in a dispute between
biological parents.65 The court held that a biological parent must “show no less
substantial a change in circumstances” as in dispute between biological parents.66
64

Id. at 378.
Id. at 377. Roberto argued that the policies underlying the parental preference doctrine
dictate that a parental preference should apply when a biological parent moves to modify
nonparental custody. Id. at 379. Therefore, Roberto insisted, a parent attempting to modify
nonparental custody does not need to show as substantial a change in circumstances as a
parent modifying another parent’s custody. Id. In addition, Roberto argued that a parent can
show a less substantial change to modify visitation. Id.; e.g., Hermosillo v. Hermosillo, 797
P.2d 1206, 1209 (Alaska 1990). However, the Alaska Supreme Court asserted that a change in
visitation is less significant to a child than a change in custody, and Roberto did not provide
any reason to view a change in permanent custody like a change in visitation. C.R.B., 959
P.2d at 379.
66
C.R.B., 959 P.2d at 381. According to the Alaska Supreme Court, research suggests that
its holding is a majority rule. Id. at 380-81. The court cited the following cases and
annotation: Ex Parte McLendon, 455 So.2d 863, 865-66 (Ala. 1984) (limited by Reuter v.
Neese, 586 So.2d 232 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991)) (ruling that a mother showing improved
circumstances and that she could provide for her child in the same manner in which the
custodial grandparents had been providing for the child failed to show that a custody
modification would materially promote the child’s welfare and best interest); Jones v.
Strauser, 585 S.W.2d 931, 932 (Ark. 1979) (holding that a father attempting to modify an order
awarding custody of his child to the maternal grandparents failed to show that the
grandfather’s death was a change in circumstances justifying a modification when considered
from the standpoint of the child’s welfare); Bivens v. Cottle, 462 S.E.2d 829, 830-31 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1995) (holding that a mother attempting to modify a order awarding custody of her
children to their grandparents was not entitled to a parental preference and was required to
show a change in circumstances); In re Whiting, 590 N.E.2d 859, 861-62 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990)
(ruling that a mother entering into a judicially approved contractual agreement giving custody
of her son to her sister and brother-law surrendered her right to a parental preference, and the
mother was not entitled to a modification of custody because she alleged a change in her
circumstances rather than in the circumstances of the custodian or the child); Johnson v.
Johnson, 681 P.2d 78, 80-81 (Okla. 1984) (holding that although a mother demonstrated that
her fitness to be a custodial parent had changed, she was not entitled to a modification of an
order awarding custody of her children to the paternal grandparents because she did not
show that this change directly affected the best interests of her children); Lear v. Lear, 863
P.2d 482, 484 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (ruling that a mother of a child in permanent custody of
paternal grandparents did not show a substantial change in her parenting abilities to warrant
relitigation of custody, and stating that evidence that the child is well adjusted in her home is
65
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Accordingly, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision.67
a relevant factor); Taylor v. Meek, 276 S.W.2d 787, 789-90 (Tex. 1955) (reaffirmed after
amendment of custody statute in In re Ferguson, 927 S.W.2d 766, 768-69 (Tx. Ct. App. 1996))
(holding that when a third party has custody of a child, a custody modification should be
ordered only when the biological parent shows a change that is positive for the child, and
reasoning that “a change of custody disrupts the child’s living arrangements and the
channels of a child’s affection”); Dyer v. Howell, 184 S.E.2d 789 (Va. 1971) (denying a father’s
petition for modification of custody from the child’s aunt and uncle to himself, and holding
that the father, who was declared not guilty of killing the child’s mother by reason of insanity
and was later determined to be mentally competent, did not show a substantial change of
circumstances); Carol Crocca, Annotation, Continuity of Residence as Factor in Contest
Between Parent and Nonparent for Custody of Child Who Has Been Residing with
Nonparent--Modern Status, 15 A.L.R. 5th 692, 807-14 (1993) (collecting cases in which
biological parents were required to prove a change in circumstances). Id at 381 n.10.
In addition, the Alaska Supreme Court held that a court may deny a motion for modification
of child custody, without a hearing, based solely on the pleadings or material beyond the
pleadings, such as affidavits. Id. at 378. The court must treat the facts alleged as
“established.” Id. (citing Christiansen v. Melinda, 857 P.2d 345, 346 n.2 (Alaska 1993)).
Roberto argued that a parent moving for modification of custody deserves the same right to a
hearing as a parent who has lost custody in a child-in-need-of-aid (“CINA”) case but claims
to be rehabilitated. Id. at 379; see, e.g., Rita T. v. State, 623 P.2d 344, 346-47 (Alaska 1981).
However, the Clarks asserted that the CINA statute stresses family preservation, and Title 25
focuses on permanently placing children in stable homes. C.R..B., 959 P.2d at 379. The
Alaska Supreme Court held that the Clarks’ arguments were more persuasive than Roberto’s.
Id. Significantly, pursuant to Rita T., once a child moves to a permanent adoptive placement,
a parent’s right to a rehabilitation hearing ends. Rita T., 623 P.2d at 346.
Prior to its decision in C.R.B., the Alaska Supreme Court had not established which standard
of review applies when there is no hearing on a motion to modify custody. Id. When there is
a hearing, the Alaska Supreme Court will overturn a custody order only if the superior court
abused its broad discretion or its factual findings were clearly erroneous. Id. (citing Hayes v.
Hayes, 922 P.2d 896, 898, n. 3. (Alaska 1996)). The Alaska Supreme Court established that
when there is no hearing, the standard of review of a denial of a motion to modify custody is
de novo. Id. The Alaska Supreme Court will affirm the decision if “the facts alleged, even if
proved, cannot warrant modification, or if the allegations are so general or conclusory, and so
convincingly refuted by competent evidence, as to create no genuine issue of material fact
requiring a hearing.” Id.
67
C.R.B., 959 P.2d at 385. The Alaska Supreme Court held that Roberto’s citizenship was
“irrelevant, as it does not affect the children.” Id. at 382. The success of Roberto’s marriage
and business were “relevant, but not controlling” because the superior court did not base its
initial custody decision on concerns relating to instability. Id. at 383. In addition, Roberto
and Penny’s purchase of a home and Roberto’s contact with his sons were “good steps
towards readiness for custody but not sufficient to warrant a change.” Id. The Alaska
Supreme Court stated that the Clarks’ health problems were illusory. Id. at 382. The Clarks’
interference with Roberto’s visitation would be a factor in a best interests inquiry but cannot
constitute a substantial change of circumstances. Id. But see Siekawitch v. Siekawitch, 956
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The Alaska Supreme Court reasoned that “we should not . . . sacrifice the child’s
need for stability in its care and living arrangements . . . .”68 The court asserted that
application of a parental preference in the initial custody proceeding may create an
“inevitable sacrifice.”69 This sacrifice occurs when the children’s interests indicate that
a court should award custody to the third party, but the third party cannot rebut the
parental preference. 70 Therefore, in an initial custody proceeding, a biological parent’s
rights are protected, despite the risk of this sacrifice. 71 The court concluded that
children’s need for stability should not be sacrificed by allowing a parental preference to
weaken the requirements for modification of custody.72
IV. ANALYSIS
In C.R.B., the Alaska Supreme Court wisely refused to apply a parental preference
in custody modification disputes between biological parents and third parties, and the
court’s decision adequately protected Peter and Brian’s need for stability. 73 However,
for the reasons analyzed below, if the Alaska Supreme Court continues to apply the
substantial change in circumstances modification standard, it may not adequately
safeguard children’s need for stability in future cases.74

P.2d 447, 451 (Alaska 1998) (holding that an inability to agree on a visitation schedule
represented a change in circumstances that warranted a re-examination of the original custody
decision). The Alaska Supreme Court stated that Roberto’s allegation that Betty Clark was
the subject of a child-in-need-of-aid (“CINA”) investigation in 1980 were speculative. C.R.B.,
959 P.2d at 383-84.
68
C.R.B., 959 P.2d at 380.
69
Id.
70
Id.; see supra notes 17-30 and accompanying text.
71
C.R.B., 959 P.2d at 380. The Alaska Supreme Court acknowledges that the “parental
preference is a vital safeguard against enabling nonparents to convince courts to remove
children improperly from their parents.” Id. In addition, the court did not want to take “a step
toward a totalitarian government.” Id. (quoting Turner v. Pannick, 540 P.2d 1051, 1054 (Alaska
1975) (Dimond, J., concurring)). In Turner, the Alaska Supreme Court expounded on the
dangerous effects of a refusal to adopt a parental preference in an initial custody proceeding.
Turner, 540 P.2d at 1054.
[W]e would be taking a step toward a totalitarian government. Children could be
removed from their parents’ custody at the will of the state, depending upon what
some governmental petty tyrant decides is meant by the term . . . ‘best interests’ of
the children. Such a state of affairs would be entirely contrary to the form of
government envisioned by the founding fathers of our nation.
Id. at 1056 (Dimond, J., concurring).
72
C.R.B., 959 P.2d at 380.
73
See discussion infra Part IV.A.1-2.
74
See discussion infra Part IV.C.
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A. Collision of Foundational Policies
1. Law’s Preference for Parental Over Third Party Custody
The law prefers parental custody over third party custody in initial custody
disputes.75 In C.R.B., the children’s biological father argued that policy reasons dictate
that a parental preference should be applied to weaken the requirements for custody
modification.76 Advocates of the parental preference assert that it is necessary to
protect the sanctity of the relationship that exists between a parent and a child.77
Application of a parental preference creates predictability and judicial economy,78 and
acts as a crucial safeguard that prevents a judge from utilizing extremely broad judicial
discretion to make decisions based on personal biases.79 In particular, utilization of a

75

See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
C.R.B., 959 P.2d at 379; see supra note 65 and accompanying text.
77
See Richards, supra note 6, at 734 (asserting that in some circumstances, parents’ rights
are not adequately protected when the courts award custody based solely on the child’s best
interests); supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. The nuclear family, which is comprised
of a married couple and their children, is the preferred social unit in America. See Bartlett,
Rethinking Parenthood, supra note 18, at 879. Parental autonomy provides incentives for
parents to raise their children to the best of their abilities by creating security that neither the
state nor third parties will interfere. Id. In addition, experts have determined that the loss
experienced by children who have been adopted and separated from their biological families is
more profound than loss caused by divorce or even death. See Bernadette Weaver-Catalana,
The Battle for Baby Jessica: A Conflict of Best Interests, 43 BUFF. L. REV 583, 600 (1995). This
sense of loss stems from an adoptee’s search for self, which is one of the fundamental
dimensions of psychological development. Id. The adoptee’s search for self is affected by
the adoptee’s attempts to deal with perceived rejection. Id. at 601. But see Katherine Bartlett,
Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293 [hereinafter Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood]
(proposing that child custody should adopt a view of parenthood based on attachment and
responsibility rather than possessiveness and rights); Thompson, supra note 28, at 572
(asserting that when courts utilize a parental preference standard, they are disregarding
contemporary psychological studies indicating that psychological ties, rather than biology,
bind a child to an adult); Salthe, supra note 5, at 545 (arguing that although a parental
preference should be applied in initial custody disputes, the definition of “parent” should be
expanded to include “psychological parents” as well as a biological parents).
78
See Kaas, supra note 6, at 1090. Kaas states, “Predictability has the benefit of
discouraging the filing of groundless cases and encouraging the settlement of pending
cases.” Id.
79
Id. at 1090. Without the parental preference, the best interest of the child standard will
be used. See supra note 23. According to Katherine Bartlett:
[T]he best interests of the child is a highly contingent social construction.
Although we often pretend otherwise, it seems clear that our judgments about what
is best for our children are as much the result of political and social judgments about
what kind of society we prefer as they are conclusions based upon neutral or
76
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parental preference mitigates the risk that a judge’s class biases 80 and lifestyle biases 81
will determine the outcome of a custody dispute. 82
Painter v. Bannister 83 is frequently cited as a vivid example of the potential social
engineering that may occur when a court applies its own value judgments rather than a
parental preference. 84 In Painter, the Iowa Supreme Court awarded permanent
custody of a young boy to his grandparents,85 even though there was no suggestion in
the record that his biological father was an unfit parent.86 The court based its decision
on a comparison of the father’s “Bohemian” lifestyle with the grandparents’
“conventional” way of life. 87
scientific data about what is “best” for children. The resolution of conflicts over
children ultimately is less a matter of objective fact-finding than it is a matter of
deciding what kind of children and families--what kind of relationships--we want to
have.
Bartlett, Re-expressing Parenthood, supra note 77, at 303. But see Thompson, supra note 28,
at 534. Thompson argues that the parental preference should be abolished. Id. at 572. He
asserts that courts have a duty to protect children under the p arens patriae doctrine. Id. This
doctrine evolved as a result of England’s feudal system, and was adopted by courts of equity
in America. Id. at 551. The parens patriae doctrine dictates that courts have an obligation to
protect individuals who cannot protect themselves, including children, the elderly, and the
insane. Id. Thompson reasons that when a nonparent is a party in a custody dispute, the
court’s focus shifts from the child to the parent. Id. at 534. Consequently, the court
abandons the child’s best interests, and also abandons its duty to protect the child under the
parens patriae doctrine. Id. at 561.
80
Custody disputes are often decided based on economic factors. See Weaver-Catalana,
supra note 77, at 605. In addition, the third party’s strategy may include an attempt to
deplete the parent’s financial resources through legal fees. Id. at 606. Weaver-Catalana
writes, “[W]e are heading down a slippery slope at the bottom of which lurks an issue we
Americans are reluctant to face: the awful realities and inequalities of wealth and class.” Id.
(quoting Richard Cohen, Class Action, W ASH. POST M AG., Sept. 12, 1993, at W9).
81
“The best interest of the child standard can be used to validate certain lifestyles while
condemning others as immoral. When the subjective morality of a parent can be used in
custody decisions, everyone, apparently is at risk.” Weaver-Catalana, supra note 77, at 607;
see, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (overturning the decision of a Florida court that
took custody of a child away from a biological parent who married a person of a different
race).
82
See Weaver-Catalana, supra note 77, at 604.
83
140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 949 (1966).
84
See Lewis, supra note 17, at 267.
85
Painter, 140 N.W.2d at 158.
86
Id. at 154. The boy’s father placed him with his grandparents on a temporary basis after
his mother and sister were tragically killed in a car accident. Id. at 153. Approximately sixteen
months later, the grandparents refused to return the boy pursuant to the father’s request. Id.
87

Id. at 154. The Iowa Supreme Court stated:
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Also, proponents of the parental preference argue that custody decisions that are
not based on biology create incentives for third parties to kidnap or wrongfully retain a
child.88 In Hoy v. Willis, 89 a testifying expert asserted that if a couple kidnapped a
baby, became its psychological parents, and were equal in all respects to the biological
parents, it would be in the child’s best interests to award custody to the kidnappers.90
Likewise, without the application of a parental preference, parents who face difficult
circumstances and need child care assistance on a temporary basis may risk losing
custody of their children.91
Based on the public policy reasons favoring the parental preference in initial custody
disputes between biological parents and third parties, some courts have extended a
parental preference to custody modification cases.92 However, for reasons discussed in
the next section, the parental preference should not be extended to modification cases,
and in C.R.B., the Alaska Supreme Court properly rejected Roberto’s arguments in

The Bannister home provides Mark with a stable, dependable, conventional, middleclass midwest background and an opportunity for a college education and
profession, if he desires it. It provides a solid foundation and secure atmosphere.
In the Painter home, Mark would have more freedom of conduct and thought with an
opportunity to develop his individual talents. It would be more exciting and
challenging in many respects, but romantic impractical and unstable.
Id.
88

See Lewis, supra note 17, at 265-66 & n.37 (stating that “many situations can be
imagined in which this result is perfectly plausible”). Katharine Bartlett proposes that third
parties should not be recognized as a possible custodians unless they prove that their
relationship with the child arose pursuant to consent from the biological parent(s) or a court
order. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood, supra note 18, at 947.
89
398 A.2d 109 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978).
90
John Batt, Child Custody Disputes and the Beyond the Best Interests Paradigm: A
Contemporary Assessment of the Goldstein/ Freud/ Solnit Position and the Group's Painter
v. Bannister Jurisprudence, 16 NOVA L. REV. 621, 655-56 (1992 ) (citing Hoy v. Willis, 398 A.2d
109 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) as evidence that a strict application of the best interests
model “may beget monsters of jurisprudential injustice”).
91
See Richards, supra note 6, at 748. In Painter, the father’s intention was to place the
children with their grandparents on a temporary basis. Painter, 140 N.W.2d at 156. Ironically,
the court proclaimed, “A father should be encouraged to look for help with the children, from
those who love them without the risk of thereby losing the custody of the children
permanently.” Id.
92
See, e.g., Anderson v. Hall, 823 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991). In Anderson, the
biological father attempted to modify a custody decree awarding custody to the child’s
grandparents. Id. at 111. The Missouri Court of Appeals ignored the plain language of the
custody modification statute, which required a change in the child’s or the custodian’s
circumstances. Id. at 115. The court applied a parental preference and modified the custody
decree based solely on changes in the father’s circumstances. Id.
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reaching its holding.93 A biological parent’s change of heart should not be permitted to
disrupt a child’s stability.94
2. Law’s Desire to Meet Children’s Needs for Stability
Almost all psychologists and psychiatrists agree that it is crucial for a child to
maintain stable and continuous relationships.95 Goldstein, Freud and Solnit (hereinafter
“Goldstein”) created a jurisprudential paradigm96 that has helped to “revolutionize” the
analysis of child custody disputes.97 Under this paradigm, a child’s psychological wellbeing is a paramount concern in custody litigation,98 and interruptions in relationships
are viewed as being extremely damaging to a child’s psychological development.99 The
amount of potential damage created by these interruptions depends on a child’s age, and
the younger the child, the greater the risk.100 Significantly, Goldstein asserts that this

93

See discussion infra Part IV.A.2.
See Bartlett, supra note 18, at 902.
95
Blair, supra note 30, at 116.
96
J. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1973). A
jurisprudential paradigm is the result of “observation, conceptualization, and imagination,”
and acts as a guide to “research, policy creation, norm construction, proof presentation, and
decision-making.” Batt, supra note 90, at 621-22. Batt states that courts can make better
decisions when expert witnesses, lawyers, and judges use paradigms. Id. at 623. This
“interdisciplinary effort” is based on law, psychiatry, and psychoanalysis. Id. at 685 n.5.
97
Batt, supra note 90, at 623. “Judges, lawyers, law professors, law students, mental
health professionals, social scientists and concerned laymen have been very affected by their
message.” Id. at 625. However, Batt argues that Goldstein is “overly apprehensive.” Id. at
641. Batt discusses a study indicating that psychiatrists claiming there is a link between
childhood trauma and adult psychopathology often derive their research from observations
of disturbed individuals. Id. Because these psychiatrists do not study individuals who
faced childhood trauma and did not develop mental problems as adults, their conclusions may
be incorrect. Id. Batt asserts, “Not every child of divorce or of a custody dispute is a victim
proximate to his or her psychic undoing. Life is as it is . . . . Children are resilient.” Id. at 64243. Therefore, the courts must examine the “totality of relevant psychosocial circumstances.”
Id. at 645.
98
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 96, at 4.
99
Id. at 32-33. In addition, Goldstein asserts that courts must look at interruptions in
continuity from children’s subjective perceptions of time and act quickly to prevent
permanent psychological harm. Id. at 41.
100
Id. at 32. The child’s needs must be analyzed by examining “the totality of relevant
psychosocial circumstances.” Batt, supra note 90, at 645. Therefore, in order to make the
optimum decision for a child, courts must determine what the child’s needs are in relation to
the child’s developmental status. Id. Erik Erikson’s theoretical model, which contains eight
life stages, is “soundly rooted in clinical observation.” Id. at 674. According to Batt,
“Erikson is certainly Western culture’s foremost student of human development.” Id.at 685
n.7. The five stages that can provide guidance in child custody disputes are as follows:
94
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damage can consist of mental illness, dependence on society, or criminal behavior.101
According to Goldstein, custody determinations should be made according to a
“least detrimental alternative” standard.102 Application of this standard maximizes a
Stage I--(approximately the first year of life). During this developmental phase, the
child has the opportunity to achieve a positive life view called basic trust. Basic
trust develops when the child is well cared for, psychologically and physically, by
an adult or adults of attachment. An appropriate experience in attachment during
this stage of development prepares one for human intimacy and social interaction in
later stages.
Stage II--(about the second and third year of life). The child seeks to develop
personal autonomy and begins to explore the home environment.
Stage III--(about age four and five). The child starts to take a serious interest in life
outside of the home. The child is learning through play. Attachments to people
outside of the home are made.
Stage IV--(approximately the sixth through the eleventh year). The child becomes
immersed in the outside culture. The acquisition of culturally approved skills and
knowledge is the major task of this stage. This is the stage of essential learning.
Stage V--(about the twelfth through eighteenth year). The child is in the process of
consolidating the emerging self. Cultural and gender identities are worked out.
Id. at 646. At the time of the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in C.R.B., both Peter and Brian
were in Stage IV of Erikson’s model. See C.R.B. v. C.C. 959 P.2d 375 (Alaska 1998). A child in
this stage is in the process of moral, cognitive, social, aesthetic, and emotional development.
Batt, supra note 90, at 651-52. Therefore, according to Batt, “To appropriately decide a child
custody case involving a learning stage child, one must think not only about the parents, but
must engage in a prospective analysis which considers the psycho-social situation of the
child in adolescence.” Id. at 653-54. However, the Alaska Supreme Court focuses on
maintaining stability in the Peter and Brian’s lives. C.R.B., 959 P.2d at 380.
101
See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 96, at 18. In addition, psychologists state that a
judicial separation of a child and a psychological parent can hinder the child’s capacity to
trust and care for others, injure the child’s self-esteem, and hurt the child’s identification with
social ideals. Thompson, supra note 28, at 562. Also, research indicates that when children
perceive that they have minimum control over environmental changes subsequent to a
divorce, they may experience depression, social withdrawal, and aggressive behavior.
Wexler, supra note 2, at 796-97. Some researchers have indicated that a change in residence
can be very detrimental to children. Id. at 796.
102
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 96, at 53. Goldstein believes that the “least detrimental
alternative” standard will serve as a reminder that custody decisions are intrinsically
unsatisfactory. Id. at 63.
The least detrimental alternative, then, is that specific placement and procedure for
placement which maximizes in accord with the child’s sense of time and on the basis
of short-term predictions given the limitations of knowledge, his or her opportunity
for being wanted and for maintaining on a continuous basis a relationship with at
least one adult who is or will become his psychological parent.
Id. at 53.
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child’s opportunity to maintain a relationship with a “psychological parent” who meets
the child’s needs on a daily basis:103
[F]or the child, the physical realities of his conception and birth are not the direct
cause of his emotional attachment. This attachment results from day-to-day
attention to his needs for physical care, nourishment, comfort, affection, and
stimulation. Only a parent who provides for these needs will build a psychological
relationship to the child on the basis of the biological one and will become his
“psychological parent” in whose care the child can feel valued and “wanted.” An
absent biological parent will remain, or tend to become, a stranger.104

Also, according to this paradigm, all custody decisions should be final since custody
modifications threaten continuity of relationships.105
103

Id. Bartlett notes that experts proclaim that children need one parent or set of parents
who have complete and undivided control of them. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood, supra
note 18, at 882. In addition, Bartlett analyzes Goldstein’s assertion that only one relationship
should be maintained when a family is torn apart because a child’s confusion regarding
loyalties will impede their adjustment to new circumstances. Id. at 908. However, Bartlett
argues against these contentions and proposes that protection of a child’s need for stability
in relationships may dictate that courts provide the means for the child to maintain significant
relationships with more than one parent or set of parents. Id. at 882. When a child’s
biological parents obtain a divorce, the law assumes that each parent will continue to have a
relationship with the child. Id. at 899. According to Bartlett, recent research indicates that
children who do not maintain contact with absent caretakers will suffer damage at every
developmental stage. Id. at 909. Maintenance of a child’s ties to the past provide feelings of
security even when the family relationship is unstable. Id. at 910. In C.R.B., the Alaska
Supreme Court noted that the superior court’s order denying Roberto’s motion for
modification encouraged Roberto to become a more involved parent, and indicated that it is
important for Peter and Brian to have a strong bond with their biological father. C.R.B. v. C.C.
959 P.2d 375, 384 (Alaska 1998). The Alaska Supreme Court indicated that the superior court
ordered that Peter and Brian fly to Seattle to visit their father twice a year. Id.
104
GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 91, at 19. This model views attachment as crucial to
healthy psychological development. Batt, supra note 90, at 629. A biological parent who is
physically absent cannot be a psychological parent. Id. Also, Katharine Bartlett proposes
three additional criteria that courts should utilize to identify a “psychological parent.”
Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood, supra note 18, at 946. First, the adult must have physical
custody of the child for a minimum of six months. Id. at 946-47. Second, the adult must
demonstrate motivations based on sincere concern and care for the child’s welfare. Also, the
child’s view of the relationship must be ascertained. The child mu st believe that the adult has
a parental role rather than a companion or a babysitter. Id. at 947. Third, to avoid the
creation of incentives for kidnapping, the petitioning adult must prove that the relationship
began pursuant to the consent of the bio logical parent(s) or a court order. Id.
105
Batt, supra note 90, at 661 (disagreeing and noting that a policy that disallows custody
modifications and “places the child at the total mercy of one parent until the end of
adolescence can do very little to insure justice for the young”).
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At the time of the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in C.R.B., Peter was nine years
old, Brian was seven years old, and their grandparents had cared for them for over five
years.106 Also, Roberto had not seen his sons during almost three years of this time
period.107 Therefore, according to Goldstein’s paradigm, it is very likely that Peter and
Brian’s grandparents were their psychological parents.108 Because destruction of
stability may be extremely detrimental to children, the law’s goal should be to promote
continuity in children’s lives.109 However, application of a parental preference focuses
on parental rights and ignores the negative consequences of tearing children away from
their psychological parents.110 Fortunately, the Alaska Supreme Court’s holding
produced an optimum result in C.R.B. because it did not tear Peter and Brian away
from their grandparents.111
B. Consequences of the Alaska Supreme Court’s Decision
Although the Alaska Supreme Court’s refusal to apply a parental preference
produced a desirable outcome in C.R.B., the substantial change in circumstances
modification standard does not adequately protect children.112 It appears that courts are
“defining changed circumstances as a change in any circumstance pertinent to the best
interests of the child, so that the two standards merge de facto.”113 The flexibility
allowed under a substantial change in circumstances standard of modification may
create undesirable consequences.114 For example, custody modification decisions
frequently reflect the belief that remarriage is a substantial change in circumstances that
106

See C.R.B. v. C.C. 959 P.2d 375, 377 (Alaska 1988).
Id.
108
See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.
109
Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood, supra note 18, at 902.
110
See Lewis, supra note 17, at 265 (discussing arguments advanced by critics of the
parental preference standard). Lewis also indicates that laws should “mandate speedy
resolution of custody disputes to prevent rewarding the party who can retain physical
possession of the child for the longest time.” Id. at 283.
111
See C.R.B., 959 P.2d at 380.
112
See C. Gail Vasterling, Child Custody Modification Under the Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act: A Statute to End the Tug-of-War?, 67 W ASH. U. L.Q. 923, 931 (1989). Vasterling
states, “Modification under this standard . . . may not promote the child’s “best interests,”
and in fact, often promotes the contrary.” Id. at 931. In addition, utilization of the substantial
change in circumstances standard produces negative consequences for each party. Id. at
930-31. Because the standard is vague and discretionary, it promotes relitigation of custody
modification disputes. Id. at 930. Relitigation creates emotional and financial turmoil for each
person who is involved in the litigation. Id. at 931.
113
See Wexler, supra note 2, at 782.
114
See id. at 796; see also Vasterling, supra note 112, at 930. Because the substantial
change of circumstances standard is vague, courts may base their custody decisions on
irrelevant changes or personal biases. Id.
107
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justifies the elimination of stability in a child’s life. 115 However, there is no empirical
support for the assumption that this remarriage will produce a stable nuclear family, and
in fact, remarriage may actually cause increased difficulties for children.116 Tragically,
if the Alaska Supreme Court continues to apply the substantial change in circumstances
standard in custody modification disputes, there is a risk that children will experience
psychological damage117 due to the destruction of stability in their lives.118
C. States Should Adopt a Revised Version of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act’s119 Custody Modification Standard
The Court’s ability to modify custody orders should be limited by strict statutory
criteria. 120 The UMDA’s drafters acknowledged the importance of stability in a child’s
life, and recognized that “insuring the decree’s finality is more important than
determining which party should be the custodian.”121 Because the UMDA’s
modification provisions promote continuity in children’s lives by placing procedural and
substantive limitations on a court’s ability to modify initial custody orders, states should
enact these provisions.122 However, the UMDA’s modification provision that requires a
115

See Wexler, supra note 2, at 795.
Id. According to Wexler, the remarriage example is only one illustration of the
“potential abuse” that may occur due to the use of “amorphous” substantial change of
circumstances standards. Id. “Courts operating under such malleable substantive rules are
able to use assumptions unsupported by empirical evidence to effect changes that, upon
closer analysis, make no sense . . . .” Id.
117
See supra note 101 and accompanying text. Social science research has influenced the
development of the law in initial custody disputes, and there is no reason that this data
should be less important in the context of custody modifications. Wexler, supra note 2, at
784.
118
See Vasterling, supra note 112, at 931-32 (recognizing that experts agree that “stability
is paramount to a child’s development” and that courts can decrease the negative
consequences that result from a disruption in stability by “ensuring the finality of the initial
custody decree”).
119
UNIF . M ARRIAGE AND DIVORCE A CT § 101-506 (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A. 159 (1998).
For a discussion of UMDA, see supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
120
See Wexler, supra note 2, at 760. Wexler indicates that custody modifications are
becoming easier to obtain, and that the “law today is moving in precisely the wrong
direction.” Id. Wexler examines social science research indicating that stability is an
important factor in children’s lives, and argues that modification is justified only in “special
cases.” Id.
121
UNIF . M ARRIAGE AND DIVORCE A CT § 409 cmt. (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A. 439-40 (1998)
(citing Andrew S. Watson, The Children of Armageddon: Problems of Custody Following
Divorce, 21 SYRACUSE L. REV. 55 (1969)).
122
Vasterling, supra note 112 at 947. UMDA section 409(b) limits the judge’s dis cretion
by dictating that the change in circumstances must relate to either the child or the custodian.
Id. at 932. Also, section 409(b) assumes that unless one of the three conditions exists, a
116
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change that seriously endangers the child’s physical or mental health123 should
specifically define “endangers seriously” to avoid a liberal interpretation by the
courts.124
V. CONCLUSION
The Alaska Supreme Court’s refusal to utilize a parental preference produced a
proper outcome in C.R.B.125 However, the substantial change in circumstances
modification standard does not adequately protect children’s need for stability.126 If
this standard is applied in future cases, there is a risk that children may face emotional
harm.127 It is better to make a biological parent cope with feelings of despair regarding
loss of custody than to make a child cope with further disruption and instability.128

Laura Beresh Taylor

change in custody does not promote a child’s best interests. Id. At 933. The UMDA requires
a two year waiting period subsequent to a final custody order, but there is a provision for
emergency situations. See UNIFORM M ARRIAGE AND DIVORCE A CT § 409(a). This emergency
provision recognizes that protecting a child from serious physical or mental harm should
always take precedence over stability in residence. See UNIFORM M ARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
A CT § 409 cmt. Wexler noted that the threshold modification standard that a movant must
satisfy during the first two years after the issuance of the decree acts as a procedural hurdle
since it is the same modification standard that all movants must establish. See Wexler, supra
note 2, at 775.
123
UNIF . M ARRIAGE AND DIVORCE A CT § 409(b)(3); see supra note 44.
124
See Wexler, supra note 2, at 782. Illinois adopted the UMDA provisions from October
1, 1977 until July 1, 1982, and Wexler indicates that Illinois’ case law is “the largest body of
judicial interpretation of the UMDA test.” Id. at 766. Wexler determined that the Illinois
courts utilized a “liberal approach to an intentionally illiberal statute” and exercised significant
discretion in granting modifications. Id. at 778; see, e.g., Kraft v. Kraft, 439 N.E. 2d 491, 496
(Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (finding that a child was in serious danger because, although she was
doing well in school, she was not achieving her potential); Jarrett v. Jarrett, 400 N.E. 2d 421
(Ill. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 927 (1980) (modifying custody to protect the children’s moral
development after the custodial parent announced that a male friend was going to be living
with her); Wexler, supra note 2, at 777-78. Therefore, the definition of “endangers seriously”
should specifically relate to whether the custodian is safeguarding the child’s physical and
mental health rather than whether the child’s best interests are being served. Id. at 782.
125
See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.
126
See discussion supra Parts IV.A.2 and IV.C.
127
See discussion supra Parts IV.A.2 and IV.C.
128
See Haynie, supra note 19, at 744. “[T]hird party custody disputes most often involve
children subjected to disruption of the traditional family by divorce, death, or other hardships.
In theses cases, the ideal family situation is not an alternative for the child.” Id. at 745.
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